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Abstract 
This paper shows that introducing a paid-vacation system tied to performance is effective in increasing the motivation 
of laborers to make effort and exercise high productivity. This effect is similar to the effects of implementing a 
performance-based wage system, on which many earlier papers have focused. We also found that the paid-vacation 
system can be particularly effective in companies where high-skilled laborers are required and labor hours are long. In 
addition, laborers' motivation can be greater when a company offers different performance-based compensation 
schemes, such as the performance-based system and the paid-vacation system, because each laborer has 
heterogeneous preference for leisure.
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     1 Introduction
Over the past thirty years, much theoretical and empirical analysis has clari￿ed that
laborers￿incentive to work and earn more money is greater under the performance-based
wage system than under the salaried or hourly paid system (Pencavel, 1977; Seiler, 1984;
Lazear, 1986; Ewing, 1996; Booth, 1999; and Parent, 1999). Lazear (2000) ￿nds that a
performance-based wage system enhances the average motivation to work, and output per
laborer increases about 44 percent. Moreover, Dohmen and Falk (2006) show empirical
results that output is much higher under several performance-based wage systems than under
a salaried compensation scheme. However, few studies have addressed the mechanisms other
than performance-based wage systems that increase laborers￿incentive to work.
This paper shows that introducing a paid-vacation system tied to performance also gives
laborers motivation to make an e⁄ort and exercise high productivity, similar to that which
is seen with a performance-based wage system. Moreover, when laborers have heterogeneous
preferences for leisure, the paid-vacation system can be more e⁄ective than the performance-
based wage system for laborers who have high-skill and have long work hours. Therefore,
we ￿nd that companies can improve their output by o⁄ering both systems to laborers and
urge them to choose one of their schemes.
2 The model
Under the salaried or the hourly paid system, even if laborers make an e⁄ort to increase
their productivity, doing so does not have an e⁄ect on their income. On the other hand,
when laborers￿productivity is evaluated under the performance-based wage system, making
an e⁄ort to increase their productivity raises their income and may also increase their utility.
Before considering the e⁄ects of such incentive mechanisms on increasing laborers￿pro-
ductivity, we examine the exercised productivity of each laborer under the salaried compensa-
tion system, where labor hours and wages are determined in order to establish a benchmark.
The individuals￿utility function is formed as follows:
U = aili ￿ w1h(li) ￿ w2f(ai); (1)
where ai indicates exercised productivity that is less than or equal to the potential ability of
individual i. li means labor hours of individual i, and functions h and f are the cost of labor
hours and the cost of the e⁄ort to show productivity ai respectively. We assume that both
the h and f functions are increasing and convex. Moreover, w1 and w2 indicate the weight
of costs from labor hours and making e⁄ort, when the weight of bene￿t from income is set
as 1. Then, w1 and w2 are positive.
It is clear that the weight of w1 is large for workers who attach weight to leisure, while
it is small for workers who receive relatively less utility from leisure. In addition, laborers
who have high skill can show high productivity with less e⁄ort. Therefore, we assume that
the w2 for highly-skilled laborers is less than that for low-skilled laborers.
2.1 Fixed labor hours and ￿xed wages
We assume that labor hours for each employee are set at ^ l and a base salary is set at y
by employment contracts. y is determined as aL^ l, where aL is the minimum productivity per
capita required from a company. Only laborers whose exercised productivity is higher than
1aL are hired, while laborers whose exercised productivity is less than aL are laid o⁄. Then
the laborers face the utility function as follows:
U = y ￿ w1h(^ l) ￿ w2f(ai): (2)
From (2), it is found that laborers do not have the incentive to show high productivity at all
as long as labor hours and incomes are determined by the employment contracts. As long
as the inequality
U = y ￿ w1h(^ l) ￿ w2f(aL) > 0 (3)
is realized, exercised productivity of each laborer becomes ai = aL, insofar as they are not
laid o⁄.
2.2 A performance-based wage system
Next, we consider laborers￿exercised productivity under a performance-based wage sys-
tem. We assume that employers restore laborers some percentage of their production that
is more than the minimum amount of production required from the company, y as a bonus
under the determined labor hours ^ l. Bonus is determined as
B = ￿(ai^ l ￿ y). (4)
(1￿￿)(ai^ l￿y) brought by a laborer is surplus production of employers which is in excess of
what it would have been under a salaried compensation scheme. In this case, each laborer￿ s
utility function is formed as
U = (1 ￿ ￿)y + ￿ai^ l ￿ w1h(^ l) ￿ w2f(ai): (5)
The ￿rst-order condition of (5) with respect to ai is
@U
@ai
= ￿^ l ￿ w2f
0(ai) = 0: (6)
From (6), a￿
i > 0 is realized, where a￿
i is the optimal exercised productivity of individual i.
If aL ￿ a￿
i is satis￿ed, laborers show their productivity aL to maximize their utility and, so
the performance-based wage system is not e⁄ective in increasing laborers￿productivity. On
the other hand, if aL < a￿
i is satis￿ed, laborers￿exercised productivity increases as long as
their potential ability is equal to or more than a￿
i.
Now, we focus attention on the e⁄ect of parameters ￿, ^ l, and w2 on the laborers￿optimal
exercised productivity and obtain the following results.
1. There is a positive correlation between a￿
i and ￿, and between a￿
i and ^ l.
2. There is a negative correlation between a￿
i and w2.
a￿
i tends to be high when a labor hour ^ l is long and the percent of the restored production
to laborers ￿ is large. Moreover, the a￿
i of high-skill laborers must be higher than that of low-
skill laborers because the value of w2 for high-skilled laborers is less than that for low-skill
laborers.
2.3 A paid-vacation system
2In this section, we consider the e⁄ects of a paid-vacation system, which is another in-
centive mechanism with which to raise laborers￿exercised productivity. We assume that
employers give paid vacations to a laborer who shows the minimum amount of production
required to keep from getting ￿red, y = aL^ l , more quickly than ^ l. That is, a laborer can
achieve his or her aim of output y by achieving greater exercised productivity than aL. In
this case, the length of paid vacations is determined as
P =
￿(ai^ l ￿ y)
ai
; (7)
where ￿ is the percentage of surplus production that is more than y. Surplus production of
employers brought by a laborer, which is production in excess of what it would have been
under a salaried compensation scheme, is (1 ￿ ￿)(ai^ l ￿ y).1
Laborers control their exercised productivity level and maximize their utility function,
which is formed as follows:
U = y ￿ w1h(^ l ￿
￿(ai^ l ￿ y)
ai
) ￿ w2f(ai)
= y ￿ w1h((1 ￿ ￿)^ l +
￿y
ai
)) ￿ w2f(ai): (8)












0(ai) = 0: (9)
When ai ! 0, the value of (9) comes close to 1 and it comes close to ￿1 when ai ! 1
because functions h and f are increasing and convex. Therefore, 0 < a￿￿
i < 1 is satis￿ed
when a￿￿
i is the optimal exercised productivity of individual i. Hence, the paid-vacation
system is e⁄ective in increasing laborers￿exercised productivity if aL < a￿￿
i and the potential
ability of a laborer i exceeds a￿￿
i .
We focus attention on the facts that some parameters, such as ￿, w1, w2, y, and ^ l, a⁄ect
the decision of the optimal exercised productivity under the paid-vacation system. Let us
consider the e⁄ects of each parameter on laborers￿productivity. Given that @U=@ai = A,





















00(ai) < 0: (10)
That is, there is a negative correlation between A and ai. From this result, we obtain several
correlations:
1. There are positive correlations between a￿￿
i and w1, between a￿￿
i and ^ l, and between
a￿￿
i and aL because y = aL^ l.
2. There is a negative correlation between a￿￿
i and w2.
1When ￿ = ￿ is satis￿ed, the surplus production of employers from a laborer is the same under the
performance-based wage system and the paid-vacation system.
3The correlation between a￿￿
i and ￿ is not clear because it depends on the function h.
Therefore, we focus on implications of the relationship between a￿￿
i and four parameters: w1,
w2, ^ l and aL.
First, (9) shows that increased w1 and decreased w2 raise the value of A. In order to
decrease the value of A to realize (9), a￿￿
i increases. That is, laborers who attach a high
weight to leisure and highly skilled laborers tend to show greater exercised productivity
under the paid-vacation system.
Second, A increases when the value of ^ l and aL rise since function h is convex; that is,
the longer labor hours and the higher the minimum required productivity per capita urge
laborers to show their greater exercised productivity.
2.4 E⁄ective incentive mechanisms
In this section, we compare the e⁄ects of increasing laborers￿incentive to work under
the performance-based wage system and the paid-vacation system using several di⁄erent
situations. First, we make three propositions.
Proposition 1 A performance-based wage system and a paid-vacation system give laborers
the incentive to increase their exercised productivity.
Proof. From (6) and (9), we ￿nd that laborers￿optimal exercised productivity a￿
i and
a￿￿
i are positive. Therefore, employers can motivate laborers to increase their exercised
productivity by introducing these systems when a￿
i and a￿￿
i are higher than aL, and when
laborers￿potential ability exceeds a￿
i under the performance-based wage system and a￿￿
i
under the paid-vacation system.
Proposition 2 A performance-based wage system and a paid-vacation system are particu-
larly e⁄ective for laborers who have high skills to increase their exercised productivity.
Proof. a￿
i and a￿￿
i are negatively correlated with w2. From the assumption that high-skilled
laborers have a low w2 value, these systems a⁄ect highly skilled laborers more than low-skilled
laborers.
Proposition 3 A company in which employees work for long hours bene￿ts from both performance-
based wage systems and paid-vacation systems.
Proof. From (6), (9) and (10), we ￿nd that a￿
i and a￿￿
i rise by increasing ^ l. That is,
a performance-based wage system and a paid-vacation system are e⁄ective in increasing
laborers￿incentive to show high exercised productivity, especially where labor hours are
long.
Considering the di⁄erence between the two mechanisms shows that laborers￿optimal
exercised productivity depends on parameters ￿, ^ l, and w2 under the performance-based
wage system, while it depends on ￿, ^ l, aL, w1 and w2 under the paid-vacation system. From
this fact, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 A company that requires a high minimum productivity per capita bene￿ts
more from a paid vacation scheme.
4Proof. The level of the minimum productivity required by a company, aL, does not a⁄ect
the optimal exercised productivity under the performance-based wage system, but it does
a⁄ect the laborers￿optimal exercised productivity, a￿￿
i , and the minimum productivity and
the optimal exercised productivity are positively correlated under the paid vacation system.
Therefore, a￿￿
i increases by requiring a high level of aL.
The performance-based wage system is more e⁄ective in raising laborers￿incentive to
work when a￿
i > a￿￿
i , while the paid-vacation system is more e⁄ective when a￿
i < a￿￿
i . Since
laborers have heterogeneous preference for leisure, a company can exploit this heterogeneity
by o⁄ering them two incentive mechanisms from which to choose.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider two compensation schemes, the performance-based wage system
and the paid-vacation system, and clarify that a paid-vacation system tied to performance
is e⁄ective in increasing laborers￿exercised productivity, similar to that which is seen in a
performance-based wage system. The paid-vacation system is e⁄ective in companies where
high-skilled laborers are required and labor hours are long. Moreover, we ￿nd that a company
bene￿ts relatively more from o⁄ering both systems because laborers have heterogeneous
preferences for leisure and they will increase their exercised productivity more when they
can choose between the performance-based wage system and the paid-vacation system.
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